Foreword
Climate change and the sustainable supply of energy are key challenges. Scalingup and deploying renewable energy sources could significantly reduce the emissions responsible for climate change and contribute to a more secure supply of energy for all.
While sustainable energy needs to be as cheap as possible, governments use green industrial policies to achieve other policy objectives,such as economic growth and employment. Governments expect to gain local benefits from increased renewable energy deployment through 'local content requirements' (LCRs), despite uncertainties about the long-term benefits and the legality of such measures under WTO law. LCRs clearly run counter to WTO rules, as has been recently confirmed by the Appellate Body in the 'Ontario case' in which Japan and the European Union (EU) complained about LCRs for renewable energy equipment in the Canadian province of Ontario.
Existing literature has already tended to monitor the frequency of LCRs for renewable energy and their overall effectiveness. This paper offers more pointed policy recommendations in the context of a sustainable energy trade agreement (SETA).
After giving an overview of LCRs in renewable energy, this paper assesses the rationale and effectiveness of LCRs. Then it presents two case studies of LCRs in renewable energy.
Finally, this paper analyses LCRs in the context of a SETA as well as alternatives to LCRs and lessons learned for future trade agreements. Given the stalemate in the WTO's Doha negotiations and thelack of a holistic perspective on energy, a SETA may present a worthwhile alternative. A SETA could address barriers to trade, enable trade policysupported energy governance, and help clarify existing ambiguities in various trade rules and agreements as they pertain to sustainable energy.
According to the paper, a SETA could provide an opportunity to change current approaches concerning LCRs for sustainable energy goods and services (SEGS). In addition to ensuring non-discriminatory treatment for the same SEGS as far as parties to a SETA are concerned, the author acknowledges that this may be challenging given the stance of various WTO members on deriving wider benefits from scaling up renewable energy.
This paper was conceived by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and written by Sherry Stephenson, Senior Fellow with ICTSD.
The paper is produced as part of a joint initiative of ICTSD's Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy and the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). Recently research on LCRs has accelerated. This paper draws and builds on the work by Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, authors of a recent ICTSD-issues paper,* as well as the work by Gary C. Hufbauer and other economists at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.** The concept of the research has been informed by ICTSD policy dialogues, in particular a dialogue on 'Clean Energy: Market and Rules' in Shanghai, China in November 2012; a high-level Roundtable in Geneva inJanuary 2013; and a policy dialogue on the occasion of the Clean Energy Ministerial in New Delhi, India in April 2013. As a valuable piece of research, it has the potential of informing innovative policy responses on sustainable energy trade initiatives and will be a valuable reference tool for policymakers involved with procurement as well as trade negotiators. We hope that you will find the paper to be a thoughtprovoking, stimulating, and informative piece of reading material and that it proves useful for your work.
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz Chief Executive, ICTSD Executive Summary
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Executive Summary
The combination of the financial crisis of 2008, together with inadequate international policy momentum on agreed policies to achieve sustainable economic development, is contributing to a new form of protectionist trade policy, namely local content requirements (LCRs) devised at the national level as a tool of green growth policy.
Local content requirements typically require a certain percentage of intermediate goods used in the production processes in renewable energy projects to be sourced from domestic manufacturers. LCRs are often coupled with other policy measures to encourage green growth.
Despite the questionable nature of LCRs under WTO rules, both developed and developing countries have turned to local content requirements. Public financing for low-carbon energy policies has been squeezed, while governments feel the need to address the pressing concerns of climate change and environmental degradation. LCRs are viewed as an attractive policy tool for the promotion of renewable energy. However, given their potential trade distortive impacts, it is imperative to address the effectiveness of LCRs in achieving green growth objectives.
Building on the work by Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout (2013), as well as the work by Gary C. , this paper reviews the breadth of LCRs in the renewable energy sector. It points out that although over 100 LCRs have been imposed since 2008, only about 20 have been applied in the renewable energy sector. These may have impacted approximately $100 billion of international trade. The effectiveness of these measures is hard to evaluate, as they have been in place in the "green" sector for only a short time.
The rationale behind LCR use is summarized in the paper which presents the pros and cons of recourse to these measures. Proponents argue that LCRs can be used to address valid environmental objectives in a context of limited financial resources, allowing firms the breathing space to reach a sustainable scale of green energy output and providing for the creation of "green" jobs. They also claim that LCRs will spur innovation in the renewable energy sector in the medium term and consequently lower green technology costs. Opponents of LCRs in renewable energy policies point to the economic costsinefficient allocation of resources, higher retail power prices, a negative impact on trade -and question as well the environmental gains in the medium-term and the ability of LCRs to create green jobs.
Two illustrative cases involving LCR use are reviewed: one involving the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec, which have both imposed an LCR requirement to accompany other policies for the promotion of wind and solar energy production. In another case, related to India, the government has imposed an LCR as part of its policy to promote solar energy output.
Given the potential trade distorting effects of LCRs and their questionable status under WTO rules, this paper puts forward options for achieving the sustainable energy use that LCRs are called upon to address. These include enhancing physical infrastructure, promoting government-sponsored financing, taking better advantage of progress in renewable energy production, and promoting innovation and training for green jobs. In addition, the paper argues that countries concerned about this policy tool might agree to focus their WTO disputes on LCRs outside the renewable energy sector.
The paper concludes by advocating a sustainable energy trade agreement (SETA) as an attractive solution to coordinate national policies with the goal of lowering the cost of renewable energy policies. Suggestions for what could be negotiated in a SETA with respect to LCRs are set out, including nonrenewable time limits for existing LCRs, a moratorium on the adoption of future LCRs, the capping of LCR percentages and an agreed 'phase-out' period during which countries might agree to include their partners in a 'regional content requirement' so that such cumulation would reduce the trade distortive impact of these measures. 
Political economy argument
Renewable energy generally costs more, per kilowatt hour (KWh), than coal-fired power. One way to enlist public support for the extra costis to tie renewable energy projects to domestic innovation and job creation through LCRs. A worthwhile research project would investigate whether countries with 'strict' LCRs in fact use renewable energy for a larger fraction of their power supply than countries with 'relaxed' LCRs (or no LCRs). The proposed investigation is well beyond the scope of thispaper, but the findings would make a valuable contribution to understanding the strength of the political economy nexus between LCRs and renewable energy.
Infant industry protection
Policy makers -usually in developing countries -contend that LCRs protect infant industries from foreign competition. LCRs present an attractive solution to allow infant industries to become internationally competitive in their renewable technology and manufacturing capability. Proponents argue that while the GATT 1947 reflected Keynesian precepts and was somewhat tolerant of government supervision of markets, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO marked a shift towards neo-liberalism and a heavy preference for market outcomes. This framework, it is argued, is not amenable for developing countries to master advanced technologies and enjoy economies of scale.
14 By contrast, LCRs afford a certain 'policy space' to develop infant industries. In addition LCRs may counteract government subsidies in other countries. According to this line of argument, LCRs provide incentives for local firms to produce and eventually innovate in the most promising green energy sectors and to lower their production costs over time.
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Green job creation
In industrialized economies, the same economic arguments for LCRs in terms of the infant industry rationale are not applicable. Instead, proponents of renewable energy LCRs in developed countries point to the creation of green jobs. By requiring firms to use a certain percentage of local inputs, demand for domestic cleaner industries will increase, spurring green job creation in the short-term. 16 In the long term, proponents argue that there are economic benefits to be gained from "learning by doing" and from increasing the supply of renewable energy. 17 Policymakers find it politically compelling to push forward green industrial programmes with LCRs, given the anticipated economic gains in employment and growth of the green sector. Both developed and developing countries implement LCRs with the two-pronged goal of achieving a robust renewable energy industry that will be competitive in international markets, and securing associated local job creation. In addition, it is sometimes argued that an expanded domestic manufacturing industry could entail a larger tax base for governments. An increased tax base allows governments to enjoy more revenues without raising tax rates. 18 However, it has not yet been demonstrated that the financial investment and incentives needed to expand the green manufacturing industry would be more than offset by the anticipated gains from a larger tax base. 19 Companies may also decide to settle in a location for reasons other than tax incentives, including the attractiveness of the overall business environment.
Environmental benefits
In the environmental arena, proponents of LCRs point to the positive spillover effects for the environment in the mediumterm. By increasing the number of players in the international market, proponents of LCRs contend that,in the mediumterm,greater competition will spur innovation in the renewable energy sector and consequently lower green technology costs. Competition and innovation should reduce the time it takes for renewable energy to compete with fossil fuels and nuclear energy. 20 Following this environmental line of argument, the mediumterm benefits will compensate the short-term disadvantages in terms of greater production costs. In addition, proponents claim that, by promoting thetransfer of technology, LCRs foster sustainable practicesworldwide.
In theory,LCRs can also facilitate a transfer of technology from learning by doing and building local capacity.The LCR forces firms to transfer technology so that the final quality of the product is maintained. As already mentioned, these positive spillover effects remain theoretical and have yet to be proven. 21 Such an LCR requirement may in fact make it even less interesting for companies to establish a productive base, thwarting the transfer of technology altogether.
Arguments against LCRs
Opponents to local content requirements in renewable energy policies point to the economic costs -inefficient allocation of resources, higher retail power prices, negligible employment gains and a negative impact on trade -and question the environmental gains in the medium-term.
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Inefficient allocation of resources
Opponents hold that LCRslead to an inefficient allocation of resources by distorting the operation of comparative advantage. "In practice, LCRs are discriminatory and can, like tariffs, constrain effective organization of sustainable energy supply chains." 23 LCRs require or create incentives for enterprises to inefficiently invest their resources in local inputsto artificially improve the competitiveness of local products, making foreign products less attractive to potential buyers. 24 In the absence of LCRs, the same resources would be invested in other sectors more efficiently. The impact of LCRs is similar to that of subsidiesthrough an inefficient allocation of resources, local products become more competitive and foreign products less so.
Proponents of LCRs argue that LCRs are a short-term policy, put in place to protect infant industries and businesses only for the amount of time needed to play 'catch up' with foreign economies by producing to scale the same products with greater efficiency, creating capacity to compete ininternational markets. In the long-term the need for LCRs will be obsolete, once enterprises are able to compete with foreign firms. Opponents point out that in reality, subsidies such as LCRs are politically sensitive. Once LCRs become a mainstay and expectation of businesses, withdrawal of government support will often be met with fierce resistance. 25 In addition, even if subsidies and LCRs are implemented with the intent of being temporary, it is possible that the relevant manufacturing sectors will never attain the level of efficiency necessary tooperate without government support. Infant industries may never become competitive enough to export their renewable energy products on the international market and instead require continuous government support. In such circumstances LCRs would become a policy of permanent protection. 26 
Higher power prices
In the short term, LCRs inflate power costs. Since firms are required to purchase local inputs that are likely to be more costly than foreign ones, their manufacturing costs are increased. Producers eventually offset the higher manufacturing costs by passing these on in the form of increased power prices to domestic consumers. 27 LCR proponents contend that in the medium and long-term, greater competition and innovation will eventually lower manufacturing costs, and hence consumer power prices, but this seems far from certain. 28 
Green job creation doubtful
Although one of the intended benefits of LCRs is job creation in the green industrial sector, it is not certain that LCRs create additional jobs. Two opposing effects are at play. On the one hand is the output effect: LCRs increase the cost of renewable energy production through higher input prices. As such, less renewable energy is produced, resulting in zero job creation and possibly job losses in the green industrial sector. However, it is also possible that there is job creation but lower returns to other factors. 29 Since LCRs require firms to source componentslocally, employment will increase in the component industry.The net effect for job creation of higher input prices and hence less renewable energy production combined with greater demand for component manufacturing is difficult to pinpoint. 30 The outcome depends on specific policies.
To make the story more complicated, countering the output effect is the substitution effect. The degree of local content required can affect whether jobs are lost or created. If the percentage of local content required is very high, then renewable energy production will be reduced, accompanied with net job losses. However if the amount of local content required is not very high, then firms might increase their employment to offset higher prices for local material. This substitution effect assumes that labor can serve as a substitute for the local material. 31 
Negative impact on trade
LCRs negatively impact trade. LCRs require firms to use material that is made locally and more expensive than foreign inputs. In the absence of LCRs, enterprises would opt for foreign-made material when that is the cheaper option. Like a subsidy, the effect of LCRs on trade is to discourage foreign imports and to stifle competition between domestic and foreign firms -by making locally produced material a requirement in theend product. The impact on trade of LCRs varies, depending on the percentage of local content required and the efficiency of existing firms. In an economy with inefficient firms, a high degree of required local content obviouslythwarts competition. The LCR becomes a very high non-tariff barrier. However, the negative impact of a high LCR on competition is lessened in an economy with more efficient firms.
In addition to the economic and environmental benefits and drawbacks set out above, LCRs may have a negative impact on the services portion of renewable energy production, as well as innovation and quality. 32 In focusing on the manufacturing segment of the value chain, LCRs do not affect the services portion of the renewable energy sector. In the short term, LCRs drive up production costs for renewable energy, but might not encourage the services components of renewable energy production. However, knowledge and technology transfers are essential for sustainable green growth. When they target manufacturing, LCRs do not take advantage of the employment gains to be made through investment in the services portion of the value chain,such as in engineering, installation and maintenance. 33 Given the critical nature of efficient services to the operation of value chains, any LCRs that target or impact services performance will have particularly detrimental cost and efficiency implications for the final products.
In addition, LCRs might hamper innovation and quality in the renewable energy sector. With a restrictive LCR in place, investors might be deterred from investing in the renewable energy sector owing to higher input prices. Meanwhile, the higher the LCR, the more the renewable energy sector will be protected from foreign competition, resulting in lower quality and higher prices.Over time, this may impact the quality of foreign direct investment (FDI) attracted to the sector and encourage rentseeking, less efficient FDI rather than cutting-edge, innovative FDI focused on both the domestic and world markets.
Chapter 4 The Effectiveness of LCRS
Little has been written on the effectiveness of LCRs generally and empirical studies on the impact of LCRs for renewable energy are especially limited. Nevertheless, Kuntze and Moerenhout outline five agreed-upon preconditions for LCRs in renewable energy production to have a beneficial impact for the domestic economy:
1. Stability and size of market First, LCRs in renewable energy must be introduced in a stable and sizablemarket that has potential for growth. In the absence of a stable market with growth potential, firms will be deterred from investing in renewable energy manufacturing. 34 Ultimately, investors are concerned with whether the higher costs incurred to produce local material will be more than compensated for through stable demand and industry growth. The larger the market, the more chance there is that welfare gains can be reached through LCRs. In addition, a large and stable market encourages transfers of knowledge and technology through learning by doing. If the existing industry and market potential are small, the LCR is unlikely to yield much in terms of welfare benefits to the host economy. 35 Second,the impact of LCRs depends largely on the percentage of local products required. To add value to the host economy, the LCR should be phased in gradually, and the percentage of local content required should not be too high. When LCR percentages are overly stringent, the LCR is more likely to damagethe local economy. When the level is more appropriate, according to jurisdiction specifics, the increased cost of production may be offset by the gain in jobs or expansion of green manufacturing, for example. However, beyond a certain LCR percentage, the higher cost of production is greater than the value gained for the local economy. The appropriate LCR percentage depends on the size of the green industrial sector and the opportunity cost of capital. 36 Fourth, Kuntze and Moerenhout find that a precondition for LCRs to be valuable to the host economy is ensuring that the subsidy to which the LCRs are to be coupled is sufficient to maintain market attractiveness. 37 There is still much research to be done on the appropriate type of subsidy for firms when introducing LCRs -for example, tax credits, soft loans, grants, capital subsidies -and which part of the value chain the subsidy should target. 38 This also depends on jurisdiction specifics, and the technology and value chain. Some form of financial support is intended topromote technology transfers. However, there remains a large gap in the research concerning the best type of financial support.
Fifth, proponents of LCRs point to the positive spillover effects -in terms of greater efficiency -that come only with time and experience. There is still much uncertainty in as to whether the greater efficiency in the long-term will be sufficient to offset the higher production costs. 39 Velosso shows that when there is already a certain level of local knowledge about the technology in question, the LCR will be more effective. 40 LCRs are less likely to bridge a wide knowledge gap between local and foreign businesses; LCRs may, however, bring added technology knowledge where a foundation has already been laid. An LCR will be more valuable if there is a high learning-by-doing potential. LCRs will yield more value to the host economy if they do not overemphasize manufacturing portions of the value chain, but also target training-by-doing to establish high-skilled workers.
Despite these five identified preconditions to gauge whether LCRs will have a positive welfare effect on the host economy, much remains uncertain. For instance, the appropriate LCR percentage will vary and depends on local market, technology, etc. There also remain questions in terms of the best subsidy -type, targeted value chain, duration and size. A misallocated subsidy could entail an additional cost and not an added benefit for the local economy. In addition, one of the chief and compelling arguments against LCRs is that they can easily become a permanent policy on account of the unwillingness of local firms to give up an obvious advantage. Thus an additional precondition is a clear timeframe for the term of the LCR, beyond which it would not be renewed.
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Chapter 5 Two Illustrative Cases Involving LCR USE
The two illustrative cases discussed below provide a flavour of the type of products and services that governments are choosing to impose LCRs in the name of sustainable development and clean energy.
Wind Energy in Canada
Wind energy capacity worldwide has grown at an incredible pace -doubling every three years according to the 2011 World Wind Energy Report. At the end of 2011, wind turbines accounted for roughly 3 percent of the world's electricity consumption. 42 Wind energy has grown especially in Canada, with the country becoming one of the top 10 producers in 2010. Thanks to a wealth of natural resources, electricity prices in Canada are the fourth lowest among OECD countries, following the United States, Mexico and Korea. After hydropower, which provides 60 percent of Canada's electricity, wind energy is one of the major renewable energy sources in Canada. The Canadian Wind Energy Association (CanWEA) intends to provide 20 percent of Canada's electricity with wind energy by 2025. 43 Regulation over Canada's electricity market varies between its 10 provinces and 3 territories, where different jurisdictions are in place. Wind energy projects almost all require municipal approval, while licensing and regulatory issues are handled at the provincial level. As a result of the federal system, the price of electricity in Canada varies considerably between regions. In Ontario, five discrete legal bodies adjudicate matters concerningelectricity generation, transmission and distribution. Nevertheless, the Province of Ontario indirectly provides over 70 percent of Ontario's electricity through the Ontario Power Generation Inc., which it owns.
Ontario
In 2009, Ontario passed the Green Energy and Green Economy Act, aiming to expand the renewable energy sector and create green jobs. Ontario's market for renewable energy is sizable and has considerable growth potential.As already mentioned, one of the conditions for LCRs to be potentially beneficial to the local economy -in terms of job creation and for green industry expansion -is existing market size coupled with capacity for growth.
As part of the Green Energy Act, Ontario introduced a feed-in-tariff (FIT) programto encourage investment in renewable energy. To spur investment in local manufacturing, and hence create green jobs, the FIT programme is coupled with an LCR. Under the LCR, firms are required to use a certain percentage of locally manufactured material for wind and solar projects in order to receive government support. The level of LCR varies depending on the type of renewable energy -wind, solar, etc. -as well as the size of the project. For wind and solar projects over 10 kilowatts (kW), the local requirement was 25 percent and 50 percent from 2009-11, respectively, and 50 percent and 60 percent from 2012 onward. 44 If the LCR is not met, firms are not eligible for FIT benefits. 45 In addition, the Act sets out specific percentage values for activities and materials that can be used in fulfilling the LCR. For example, local steel used to produce turbine towers earn a value of 9 percentage points, and turbine towers that are made locally earn 4 percentage points. 46 The benefit of allocating different percentages to different activities and materials is that it gives policymakers flexibility in targeting green development or job creation. This is the first time that a LCR has been introduced in Ontario, and it was not phased in gradually. As a result of Ontario's Act and associated LCR, retail electricity prices increased by more than 17 percent in 2010 and are expected to continue to increase. 47 At the same time, however, Ontario's government said that the Green Energy Act led to the creation of 20,000 jobs. Ontario's FIT scheme does not pay enough attention to investing in training to increase workers' skills or setting renewable energy targets, which would incentivize investors based on perceived guaranteed demand. 48 Japan,later joined by theEuropean Union (EU), filed a WTO complaint against Canada's FIT scheme largely because of the LCR.The plaintiffs argued that the LCR connected to the FIT violated three different sets of WTO rules: the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), the national treatment requirement of Article III of the GATT and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). 49 Wilke writes: "It is not the FITprogramme as such, but a controversial 'local content' provision of Ontario's FIT that landed Canada at the WTO. The 'made-in-Ontario' requirement demands that up to sixty percent of all green energy project inputs (goods and services) be manufactured or provided for in the province." 50 Canada defended Ontario's FIT programme arguing that since the FIT programme aims to expand renewable green energy, GATT Article XX (General Exceptions) comes into play and protects the programme from other GATT disciplines as well as the TRIMS. With respect to the SCM, Canada countered that the FIT programme involves government procurement, making it exempt from the agreement, as Canada had not included renewable energy products among its list of procurement items.
In December 2012, the WTO panel concluded that Ontario's LCR, as a part of its FIT programme, was in violation of provisions in the GATT and the TRIMS. However, the WTO panel rejected the claim that the scheme constituted an'actionable subsidy' under the SCM (FIT porgramme being directed at domestic usage rather than exports). In early 
Quebec
WhileOntario implemented an FIT programme, Quebec introduced a request for proposal (RFP) scheme. However, each scheme was coupled with an LCR.
In 2011, 97 percent of Quebec's electricity was hydro generated. 52 In its most recent energy strategy document, the government of Quebec made it a goal to build 4 gigawatts (GW) of wind power by 2015 as a complement to hydro energy. Although Quebec has a stable market, its wind energy market potential is considerably smaller than Ontario's -4 GW compared with 24 GW. In July 2012,the government in Quebec outlined the most recent RFP to increasewind energy capacity by 700 MW, coupled with an LCR. Under the LCR, 30 percent of the turbine costs had to be spent in the Gaspesie and Matane municipalities, and 60 percent of the overall costs had to be spent in Quebec.Both the 30 and 60 percent LCRs had additional stipulations. For example, in the case of the 30 percent requirement, the following costs were exempt:wind turbine warranties; transportation of wind turbines; building, testing and commissioning of the turbines; and maintenance and operating costs. 54 Meanwhile the 60 percent LCR included the following costs: initial development costs; the cost of wind turbines; and construction and transportation costs. The LCRdid not, however, include maintenance and operating costs, warranty coverage costs, or payments to landowners. 55 Reading beyond the fine print, Quebec's LCRprogramme points to the policymakers' goal of increasing capital investment in plant manufacturing and creating jobs.
Canada's approach to meeting growing electricity demand and expanding the renewable energy industry has varied between provinces, with Ontario's (FIT programme and Quebec's RFP approach. As with any trade barrier, LCRs in the cases of Ontario and Quebec increase the cost of producing renewable energy. The higher cost of renewable energy production from wind turbines will be passed on to consumers through higher electricity prices.In a study by economists at the Peterson Institute, it is estimated that the LCRs in Canada resulted in an additional USD386 per kW of installed capacity. At this rate, the additional cost incurred for the 800,000 kW of wind power installed in Ontario since 2009 amounts to over USD300 million. And for Quebec, where more than 500,000 kW have been installed since 2009, the additional costs amount to nearly USD200 million. 56 
Solar Energy in India
India's electrical infrastructure is outdated and unreliable. Existing energy resources have not kept pace with India's growing electricity demands. In July 2012, India experienced the largest power outage in its history. Over 620 million people -roughly 9 percent of the world population -were affected.
In 2010 India launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM). 57 The JNNSM, overseen by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, aims to increase solar power by installing 20GW of grid capacity by 2022 in three phases: Phase 1) 1000 MW by the end of 2013; Phase 2) an additional 3000 MW by the end of 2017; and Phase 3) an additional 16,000 MW by the end of 2022. India's solar subsidy programme was enacted to increase domestic manufacturing capacity and green jobs, promote sustainable growth, and reduce energy costs. Although the JNNSM scheme was devised in 2010, the 2012 power outage catalysed momentum to establish India as a leader in solar energy manufacturing and deployment. As part of the Indian government's policy in the area of solar energy, an LCR was introduced in 2010.
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Like Canada's FIT and RFP programmes, subsidies are propelling the renewable energy industry in India's JNNSM scheme. Solar energy is distinct from other types of renewable energy industries worldwide in that it receives a disproportionate amount of subsidies. In 2011, the subsidies towards solar energy constituted nearly 30 percent of total global subsidies for renewable energy. 59 Without subsidies, solar power is rarely viable and would not be the renewable energy of first choice. As such, it is hard to estimate an international price for solargenerated electricity, since each country has in place different subsidy schemes and incentives. Solar technologies, or photovoltaic (PV) systems, consist mostly of cells and modules.
An LCR is part of the JNNSM scheme,under which solar developers must purchase domestically manufactured crystalline silicon (CSi) modules. While the JNNSM mandates that solar producers purchase CSi modules that are manufactured domestically, solar developers using thin film technology are exempt from the LCR. In response to the LCR, the majority of solar developers in India have turned to imported thin film technology. Worldwide, only 11 percent of PV deployment uses thin film, and the remaining 89 percent is in CSi. 60 However,as a result of India's LCR, more than 70 percent of solar developers have opted for cheaper imported thin film technologies rather than local CSi modules. 61 India is the only PV market in the world where thin film is the dominant solar energy technology. 62 Solar developers tend to prefer CSi modules because of their efficiencybetween 12 and 24 percent of solar radiation is converted to electricity in comparison with between 4 and 12 percent for thin film. 63 However, in India, thin film technology is preferred to CSi modules, because the LCR on domestically manufactured CSi modules makes the thin film a much cheaper option.
An additional reason solar producers in India prefer thin film technology is the better international financing options for solar energy projects not having anLCR, i.e. thin film. For example, both the Export-Import Bank of the United States(Ex-Im Bank)and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation have offered low-interest loans to solar energy firms provided they use thin film produced in the United States (US). In 2010 and 2011, the EX-IM Bank lent USD 248 million to Indian firms that bought thin film modules. 64 Such a condition has increased Indian demand for US thin film, while in India there has been an overproduction of silicone PV cells and modules. The Ex-Im Bank financing distorts the impact of the LCR by lowering the cost of electricity through loans with low interest rates, and by shifting solar developers' module purchases away from domestically manufactured ones to imported ones.
The application of the JNNSM LCR exemption for thin film has shifted the solar technology market in India from CSi to thin film. As a result, domestic manufacturing has made negligible gains, and the LCR has slightly increased the cost of PV systems. Domestic manufacturers have scaled back the operations of their solar plants, operating below capacity or closing down altogether. In addition, the shift to thin film deployment has undermined anticipated economic and job growth from the JNNSM.
Without the LCR in place, solar developers in India would be able to import CSi modules and cells. Thin film modules are slightly cheaper than CSi on a per-watt basis. However, thin film modules have a lower efficiency, which translates to added costsfor the developer. As such, even though thinfilm modules might have a lower price per KWh than CSi modules, the overall cost might be higher once efficiency differences are taken into account. It has been suggested that an additional reason for the thin film preference of Indian solar developers is that the hot climate provides ideal conditions to maximize thin film efficiency.In the aforementioned study by economists at The Peterson Institute, it is estimated that India's LCRtranslates to a price increase of up to 12 percent for PV modules and 3 percent for PV systems for the solar developer.Meanwhile, the LCR has resulted in an estimated 3 to 7 percent additional growth in domestic manufacturing of modules, compared withthe market without the LCR. 65 It is expected that the price of CSi modules on the international market will decline because of technology advancements. As the price falls, the effect of the LCR will be greater.
Although global prices for CSi modules and cells continue to fall, owing to improved technology, Indian manufacturing competitiveness for CSi technology has not kept pace. The LCR is likely to discourage innovation in the solar energy industry and impede manufacturing competitiveness. The LCR might boomerang India's solar manufacturing and electricity goals.
Before the JNNSM program was introduced, India's manufacturing sector for solar cells and modules was relatively small and relied on exports; between 70 and 80 percent of locally manufactured solar material was exported. 66 However, there are several obstacles hindering India from being a hub of renewable solar energy manufacturing and deployment and from being internationally competitive. First, thereis an unfavourable business environment, in whichIndian banks and international lenders are reluctant to finance solar energy projects that are perceived to be a high risk.Second, there are lacking economies of scale.India's current infrastructure lacks the capacity to produce solar modules and cells to meet the target goal of JNNSM. While foreign solar module manufacturing tends to produce 75 MW of capacity per line, India's infrastructure produces only 10-20 MW. 67 To increase solar energy production, India would first have to invest in fixed infrastructure.
Third,India's solar technology and knowledge is lacking in comparison withforeign competitors. Greater investment is needed in fixed costs -infrastructure -as well as the services portion of solar energy production, namely trainingof workers.India's LCR targets the manufacturing of solar modules rather than the services segment of the renewable solar energy sector. Manufacturing accounts for only 25 percent of jobs on the solar electricity value chain. The majority of jobs require more training in installation and sales. 68 The narrow focus of the LCR limits its capacity to create jobs. Shifting the focus of the LCR more downstream to the services portion of the value chain would promote greater transfer of renewable energy technology and knowledge, and increase the long-term capacity for green job growth.
The aim of the LCR is to facilitate domestic solar producers to overcome the above domestic obstacles to develop solar energy infrastructure and technology capacity to eventually develop economies of scale, and become competitive enough to export solar technology on the international market. However, the LCR in India's solar technology area has resulted in higher costs for PV modules and cells, which have been passed on to the consumer.
In February 2013, the US formally brought a complaint against India's subsidies before the WTO. 69 Indian policymakers contend that the JNNSM programmeshould not come under WTO scrutiny, because India is not developed like Canada and it does not have a large market share in renewable energy products. This is not unusual. Policymakers in developing countries have proposed special treatment with regards to regulation of nontariff barriers for environmental goods and services, such as greater time allowance for implementation and fewer reductions.
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In addition, the Indian government defends the JNNSM -and its associated LCRs -on the grounds that the programme consists of government procurement, since solar power is first purchased by the public National Thermal Power Corporation.
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Options and Alternatives for Dealing With LCRS
Although LCRs are prohibited under the WTO, both developed and developing countries use LCRs in renewable energy policies. Despite concerns about the consistencyof LCRs, they need to be considered in the broader context, given the legitimate environmental concerns they are presumably set to address and the fact that renewable energy is essential to mitigate climate change and environmental degradation. Monkelbaan writes: "Environmental goods and services have become subject to special attention as sectors with potential win-win outcomes for both trade and the environment. Climate-friendly goods, technologies and related services can be a meaningful component of climate change mitigation strategies." 72 However, further technological innovation for renewable energy is costly, requiring considerable government support. To sustain a permanent shift towards green industry and renewable energy, positive and well-directed incentives are needed.
In the interests bothof the global economy and efficient renewable energy production by developing as well as developed countries, less distortingoptions and alternatives for dealing with LCRs should be considered. Less distorting options would put less stress on the multilateral trading system and would serve to address the legitimate concern that countries have when they try to stimulate employment while pursuing climate and energy policies. Such suggestions include, in particular, investment in infrastructure, promotion of government financing for infrastructure investment, creation of a better and more conducive business environment for firms in which to innovate toward more green technologies and targeted and welladapted training programmes for workers to allow them to develop skills for the energy sector with environmentally friendly technologies. Addressing conditions that are hinderingthe development of competitiveness in renewable energy manufacturing and services should be a high priority, together with providing a better enabling environment for firms to operate.
Enhancing Physical Infrastructure
An important factor in contributing to the progress of renewable energy is the enhancement of physical infrastructure. In this context, working toward the goal of achieving economies of scale, governments should prioritize infrastructure investment.
Promoting Governmentsponsored Financing
In the context of the development of physical infrastructure, financing is often a big constraint for developing countries. Regardless of the extent of renewable resources, or the potential for market growth, developing countries often lack the financial capacity to subsidize renewable energy or the political capacity to impose carbon taxes -arguably the best policies to foster renewable energy. Therefore, they resort to LCRs. To address this constraint, government-sponsored financing should be promoted, such as loan guarantees for developers of alternative, green energy. 
Taking Better Advantage of Progress in Renewables
The advent of new technology and the rapid increase in production capacity in renewable energy resources, such as solar and wind, have made them more competitive against conventional technology in energy.
Other sources of clean energy, including geothermal and biomass, are becoming more attractive and provide a huge potential for electricity production. Mandatory biofuels for transportation and less polluting energy use should be refined so as to be in balance with the need to preserve the biodiversity and lands needed to produce food resources. Policies such as FITs and other incentive mechanisms to stimulate investments in renewable energy may be continued and enhanced as long as they are also required to ensure a healthy growth of renewable deployment that will further provide attractive returns to investors. The latter Dialogue provided an opportunity to better understand LCRs, the domestic policy objectives they try to address, their regional economic and commercial impacts, the impacts on economies using them, the impacts on economies subjected to them and ways APEC economies can seek to achieve domestic economic policy objectives through measures that achieve the same results but without distorting international trade and investment. Leaders of APEC economies have agreed to consider a list of alternative policies and measures to LCRs at their next meeting in July 2013. APEC members are also considering the possibility of having case studies carried out on how LCRs external to them are impacting their trade and investment interests. 
Promoting Innovation and Training for Green Jobs
Chapter 8 Addressing LCRS Within a Seta
A SETA presents an attractive solution to coordinate national policies with the aim of lowering the cost of renewable energy policies.
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Negotiating a SETA would provide an excellent way to address renewable energy concerns in a trade-friendly manner. To avoid the curse and cost of permanent protection, countries might agree within a SETA a non-renewable time limit, say of 10 years,for their existing LCRs. To allow for an orderly transition and avoid litigation, signatories to a SETA could agree on a 'peace clause', so that they would not risk being taken to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body for existing LCRs during this agreed phase-out period.
Governments might also consider agreement on a moratorium or standstill on the adoption of future LCRs within a SETA. This was done by the Group of Twenty (G20) with respect to trade protectionist measures during the economic recession of 2008-2010. To backstop such commitments, concerned countries might call upon the WTO Secretariat, through its Committee on Trade and Environment, to launch a surveillance programme of LCRs in the renewable energy space. The programme would report on instances of adoption of LCRs and, where possible, assess their effectiveness. Reaching such an agreement in a SETA would reduce the risk for repeated trade disputes at the WTO and provide more clarity and certainty for business as well.
Under a SETA, countries might agree to include their partners in a 'regional content requirement' (RCR)rather than using LCRs, at least for scheduled projects during the agreed phase-out period in the renewable space. For example, the scheduled RCRs might refer to certain wind turbine components. This effective 'cumulation' of the LCR within the region constituted by the members to the SETA would effectively dilute the restrictive impact of the measure. Although an RCR might create some trade diversion, it would be less than that created by LCRs imposed purely at the national level. This trade diversion would have to be weighed against the environmental objectives.
Bearing in mind the scholarly literature on LCR effectiveness, countries might agree within a SETA to cap their LCR percentages at a moderate level, appropriate for the sector in question.Such a cap could be either maintained throughout the agreed phase-out period or could be agreed as a permanent deviation from existing rules. The former would likely be a more easily acceptable option. This limit might be best negotiated in the context of a SETA, against other tradeoffs in the environmental area. Although such a cap could also be carried out unilaterally, the SETA would provide a vehicle to specifically address the cost-benefit analysis of the recourse to LCRs in order to best evaluate how well such measures work in practice to meet the shared objective of moving toward a 'greener economy' in light of their tradedistorting effects.
Moving forward with negotiating a SETA could serve to facilitate alternative or innovative approaches to liberalizing sustainable energy goods and services. It could provide a framework conducive to assessing the linkages between sustainable energy goods and energy services, and serve as a useful 'laboratory,' where rules and disciplines pertaining to sustainable energy could be clarified and take shape. 
